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A HARD AND FLAST RULE FOR
TAXPAYER STANDING: VALLEY FORGE
CHRISTIAN COLLEGE v. AMERICANS
UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH &
STATE, INC.
The article III "case and controversy" limitation on federal ju-
dicial power1 requires that a plaintiff have "standing" to bring suit
in federal court.2 A litigant is granted article III standing only
upon demonstration of actual or threatened individual injury3 re-
1 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article III of the Constitution provides that federal
judicial power extends to "all Cases" arising under federal law, treaties or the Constitution,
as well as those involving ambassadors, ministers and consuls. Id. Additionally, article III
limits federal judicial power to "Controversies" in which the United States is a party, and
those between (1) two or more states, (2) a state and citizens of another state, (3) citizens of
different states, (4) citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states,
and (5) a state or its citizens, and foreign states or citizens. Id. To meet the federal case or
controversy requirement, a plaintiff must bring suit "in an adversary context and in a form
.. . capable of judicial resolution." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). Thus, article III
precludes federal courts from rendering advisory opinions, see United States v. Fruehauf,
365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961); Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461
(1945); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911), and from adjudicating collusive
suits, see United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943); Chicago & Grand Truck Ry. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892).
2 The doctrine of standing eludes precise definition, for it is comprised of a blend of
constitutional requirements derived from article III and the Supreme Court's self-imposed
prudential limitations. The Supreme Court itself often fails to clearly distinguish the fea-
tures of each component. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 97 (1968); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 573 (1947). Standing
differs from other elements of justiciability in that it focuses primarily on the status of the
complaining party, and only secondarily on the issues sought to be adjudicated. Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. at 99-100. In addition to standing, other doctrines related to the case or
controversy limitation on justiciability include ripeness, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
503-04 (1961), mootness, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974), and the politi-
cal question doctrine, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939). See generally L.
TRIBE, AMRICAN CONsTrruTiONAL LAW §§ 3-7 to 3-16, at 52-79 (1978).
3 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 617 (1973); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962); L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-19, at 82-89. The personal-stake or injury-in-fact require-
ment serves several purposes. One is "to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination." Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 204. Another purpose served by the injury requirement of standing is to
prevent the "judicial process from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of
the value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687
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suilting from the challenged action.4 In recent years, judicial recog-
nition of what is actionable personal injury has become more ex-
pansive.5 In the area of federal taxpayer standing, the Supreme
Court eased the rigid standing requirements that historically had
been imposed upon individual taxpayers, and held that a federal
taxpayer had standing to challenge only congressional appropria-
tions under the taxing and spending clause that allegedly violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment.6 Recently, how-
(1973); see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 106. Maintenance of the separation of powers is also
served when federal judicial power can only be invoked by injured litigants. Such a limita-
tion ensures that the judiciary is employed only when necessary and as a tool of last resort.
See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. at 95, 97; Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919); Chicago & Grand
Truck Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892).
Early standing decisions employed a "legal interest" test which required a plaintiff to
show that the challenged governmental action threatened one of his legally protected consti-
tutional or statutory interests. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113,
125 (1940); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939); Alabama Power Co.
v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938). This test was later criticized as "going to the merits" and
ultimately was overruled and replaced by the injury-in-fact test, Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 158 (1970). See Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 255-56 (3d
Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church & State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450, 452-53 (1970); Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A
Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REv. 479, 482-85 (1972).
" The injury in fact suffered by a plaintiff must be caused by or fairly traceable to the
defendant's challenged conduct, such that the injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976); see Glad-
stone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261-62 (1977); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973);
L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-21, at 92-93.
5 Economic injury has been the most commonly recognized basis upon which standing
is granted to a plaintiff, but standing has been expanded to embrace injury to one's "'aes-
thetic, conservational, and recreational' [values] as well." Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (quoting Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf., 384 U.S. 941 (1966)); see United States v. SCRAP, 412
U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973) (injury to environment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35
(1972) (injury to environment-standing denied due to plaintiffs' failure to allege their use
of land in question); Albert, Justiciability and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Rela-
tionship, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1139, 1147-51 (1978); Sedler, supra note 3, at 481-82, 487-88.
1 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968). Federal taxpayer standing has been limited to
the Flast formulation that a federal taxpayer will have standing to challenge only those
congressional exercises of the taxing and spending clause which allegedly violate the estab-
lishment clause. See Protestants & Other Ams. United'for Separation of Church & State v.
Watson, 407 F.2d 1264, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271, 1273-74
1983] TAXPAYER STANDING
ever, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc.,7 the Supreme Court held that
a plaintiff group dedicated to separation of church and state lacked
standing, as citizens or as federal taxpayers, to challenge on estab-
lishment clause grounds the federal government's grant of property
to a religious educational institution.8
Valley Forge involved the Federal Property and Administra-
(D.D.C. 1981); infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. Before Flast, the Supreme Court
had denied standing to a federal taxpayer who challenged, on due process grounds, the con-
stitutionality of the Maternity Act of 1921, which provided federal funding to the states for
the purpose of improving maternal and infant health. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,
448 (1923). The Court held that the plaintiff failed to show that she sustained any direct
injury, either immediate or threatened, as a result of enforcement of the Act. Id.
Even before Frothingham, state and municipal taxpayers had been granted standing in
federal court to challenge the illegal use of state and local tax monies. E.g., Crampton v.
Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601, 609 (1880). The inconsistency of permitting federal court challenges
of local government action by state taxpayers while disallowing challenges of the federal
government by federal taxpayers was explained by the Frothingham Court as the difference
between a local taxpayer's interest in the use of a municipality's funds---"direct and imme-
diate," 262 U.S. at 486, and a federal taxpayer's interest in the distribution of the Federal
Treasury-"comparatively minute... remote, fluctuating, and uncertain," id. at 487. Yet,
before Flast, the standing requirements applicable to state taxpayers raising constitutional
questions in federal court remained confused and unclear. See Comment, Standing to Con-
test Federal Appropriations: The Supreme Court's New Requirements, 22 Sw. L.J. 612, 617
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Standing to Contest Federal Appropriations]. For
instance, in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), a case on appeal from state adju-
dication, the Supreme Court reached the merits of an establishment clause challenge with-
out considering the question of taxpayer standing. Id. at 15-17. In Doremus v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1952), however, the Court denied the state taxpayer standing to
appeal a state supreme court determination. Id. at 435. Distinguishing Everson, the
Doremus Court concluded that the activity in Everson (reimbursement of transportation
costs to parents of children attending parochial schools) was supported by state taxes,
whereas the activity in Doremus (required bible reading in public schools) was not shown to
cause disbursement of state tax funds. Id. at 434. After Flast breached the Frothingham
barrier against federal taxpayer suits, federal courts have been rather liberal in awarding
state taxpayers standing to attack state spending that allegedly violates the establishment
clause. See, e.g., Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 927 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980) (cita-
tion to Flast as precedent to grant city taxpayers standing to challenge city expenditures to
construct platform for papal mass and ceremonies), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Mem-
bers of Jamestown Sch. Comm. v. Schmidt, 525 F. Supp. 1045, 1046 (D.R.I. 1981) ("[it is
undisputed that plaintiffs have standing to challenge expenditures under [the state] statute
as violations of the Establishment Clause"). Nearly all state courts presently entertain state
and municipal taxpayer's suits. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 108 & n.2 (Douglas, J., con-
curring); Comment, Standing to Contest Federal Appropriations, supra, at 614 & n.13. See
generally Comment, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895, 900-02
(1960).
7 454 U.S. 464 (1982), rev'g 619 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1980).
8 Id. at 470, 482, 489-90.
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tive Services Act of 1949,e which authorizes the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)'0 to sell or lease surplus
government property to nonprofit, tax-exempt educational institu-
tions. 1 The Secretary is required to discount the transfer price of
the property by considering any benefit that may accrue to the
public from the transferee's use of the property. 2 In 1976, the De-
' Act of June 30, 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 377 (codified at 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-544 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980) and scattered sections of 41, 44 & 50 app. U.S.C.). The Act repealed several
sections of the Surplus Property Act of 1944, ch. 479, 58 Stat. 765, the major purpose of
which was to provide for the handling and disposal of war-generated surplus property. H.R.
REP. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1475,
1475. Congress enacted the Act in response to a serious need for an improved federal prop-
erty management program, as evidenced by such conditions as "excessive stocks, unneces-
sary duplication, lack of maximum utilization, unauthorized augmentation of congressional
appropriations by free transfer of cash equivalents. . ., heavy direct losses to the Treasury,
and waste in other forms." 1943 REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS ON H.R. 2795, quoted in H.R. REP. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1476. Thus, the Act's general purpose is to
provide "an economical and efficient system for ... the procurement ... the utilization
... [and] the disposal of surplus property." 40 U.S.C. § 471 (1976).
'0 The Secretary of HEW was empowered by the Administrator to transfer surplus
property pursuant to the Act for health and educational purposes. 40 U.S.C. § 484(k)(1)
(1976). After the establishment of the Department of Education, see Department of Educa-
tion Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (Supp. IV 1980); S. REP. No. 49, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1514, the HEW function of
donating surplus property for educational purposes was transferred to the Department of
Education, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 3411, 3441(a)(2)(P), 3447 (Supp. IV 1980). Hence, the Secretary
of Education is now responsible for the disposition of surplus real property, including build-
ings situated thereon, "for school, classroom, or other educational use." 40 U.S.C. §
484(k)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The rules and regulations promulgated by the Depart-
ment of HEW for transfer of surplus property to educational institutions, which appeared in
Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, see 45 C.F.R. subtit. A, pt. 12 (1978), have been
adopted by the Department of Education and recodified in Title 34 of the Code, see 34
C.F.R. pt. 12 (1981).
1 40 U.S.C. § 484(k)(1)(A) (1976). The Act established an executive branch agency
known as the General Services Administration, headed by an Administrator appointed by
and subject to the control of the President. Id. § 751; see H.R. REP. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 2, reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1475, 1476. The Administrator
requires federal agencies to maintain inventories of property under their control and to
identify any excess property, which is transferred to other agencies that need it, or any
surplus property, which may be transferred to other private or public entities. See 40 U.S.C.
§ 483(b)-(c), 484(c) (1976). The term "excess property" is defined by the Act as "any prop-
erty under the control of any Federal agency which is not required for its needs and the
discharge of its responsibilities. . . ." Id. § 472(e). When excess property is no longer of use
to any federal agency, as determined by the Administrator of General Services, it is "surplus
property" and may be disposed of as designated by the Administrator. See id. § 472(g).
Most disposals of surplus property must be accomplished through publicly advertised com-
petitive bidding. Id. § 484(e)(1).
11 This discount, known as a "public benefit allowance," is subject to the disapproval of
the Administrator of General Services. 40 U.S.C. § 484(k)(1)(A), (C) (1976); 34 C.F.R. §
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partment of HEW transferred a 77-acre tract of surplus govern-
ment property 3 to Valley Forge Christian College, a sectarian in-
stitution devoted to bible study, Christian service and theology.
14
The Secretary, granting a 100% public-benefit discount, conveyed
the property payment-free to the college in exchange for its agree-
ment to use the property for 30 years exclusively for designated
educational purposes. 5
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.
(Americans United) and four of its directors brought suit against
the Department of HEW, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
to void the transfer."6 The plaintiffs, as citizens and federal tax-
payers, challenged the conveyance as a deprivation of the fair and
constitutional use of their tax dollars in violation of the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment.'7 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, dismissing the
12.9(a)-(b) (1981). The regulations provide that the property is to "be awarded to the appli-
cant having a program of utilization which provides, in the opinion of the Department [of
Education], the greatest public benefit." 34 C.F.R. § 12.5 (1981). The factors upon which the
Secretary's public-benefit allowance may be based include the applicant's tax support, edu-
cational accreditation, sponsorship of public service training, plans to introduce new instruc-
tional programs, commitment to student health and welfare, research, and service to the
handicapped. Id. pt. 12, exhibit A.
13 454 U.S. at 468. The property transferred to the Valley Forge Christian College was
part of 181 acres of land in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. Id. at 467. It was purchased with
federal tax funds by the Department of the Army in 1942, and an Army hospital was built
thereon, at a cost exceeding $10 million. 619 F.2d at 253. The land and buildings were iden-
tified as "surplus" in 1973 by the Administrator of General Services. 454 U.S. at 467-68.
14 454 U.S. at 468. Valley Forge Christian College operates under the Assemblies of
God, a religious order, and its main purpose is "to train leaders for church related minis-
tries." Id.
15 Id. While the land conveyed to Valley Forge Christian College alone was appraised at
$577,500, id. & n.7, the total fair market value of the property was estimated to be in excess
of $1.3 million at the time of the transfer. 619 F.2d at 253. The use limitation was for the
educational purposes described in the college's application for the property. The college
stated it would add to its arts and humanities offerings and strengthen its psychology and
counselling courses. 454 U.S. at 469. The circuit court noted that hundreds of church-de-
nominated institutions have been granted government property under the Act, nearly al-
ways with a 95 to 100% public-benefit discount. 619 F.2d at 254. The court stated that the
total fair market value of government property transferred to such organizations exceeds
$25.7 million and that the property was originally acquired by the government at a cost of
almost $64.5 million. Id.
16 619 F.2d at 254. Americans United is a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization composed
of 90,000 taxpayer members. Id. As declared in its articles of incorporation, the purpose of
Americans United is "'to defend, maintain and promote religious liberty and the constitu-
tional principle of the separation of church and state."' Id.
17 454 U.S. at 469. The establishment clause provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion . . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
1983]
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complaint, determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing as tax-
payers to challenge the transfer of property since the transfer was
effected pursuant to legislation that derived its power not from the
taxing and spending clause, but from the property clause of the
Constitution. i8 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed and remanded, holding that although the plaintiffs lacked
taxpayer standing, they had citizen standing.19 This standing, the
court reasoned, was based upon injury in fact to the plaintiffs'
"shared individuated right" to a government that does not estab-
lish religion.20 The Supreme Court, in a sharply divided opinion,
,8 Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
HEW, No. 77-1321 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 1978). Because the legislation that authorized the
transfer was enacted pursuant to the property clause, the district court decided that the
plaintiff taxpayers failed to show, under the Flast test, a link between their status and the
type of legislative enactment attacked. See 619 F.2d at 260. The property clause of the
Constitution provides Congress with the "[P]ower to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the. . .Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
9 619 F.2d at 254.
20 Id. at 254, 261. Judge Adams, writing for the Third Circuit panel, viewed the Flast
Court as constrained to a finding of only taxpayer standing because the plaintiffs therein
asserted only taxpayer injury. Id. at 261-62. But, Judge Adams maintained, "[tihe underly-
ing justification for according standing in Flast it seems, was the implicit recognition that
the Establishment Clause does create in every citizen a personal constitutional right, such
that any citizen, including taxpayers, may contest under that clause the constitutionality of
federal expenditures." Id. at 262. Since Americans United also alleged injury to their inter-
est in the separation of church and state, an interest protected by the establishment clause,
the court found that they suffered sufficient personal injury to confer standing. Id. at 262,
265.
Judge Rosenn, in a concurring opinion, argued that the first amendment is distinguisha-
ble from other constitutional provisions "which do not depend primarily upon judicial en-
forcement for their efficacy and where alleged violations thereof thus do not give rise to a
judicially cognizable controversy." Id. at 266 (Rosenn, J., concurring). The concurrence as-
serted that the first amendment, because of its fundamental protection against majoritarian
abuse, must be enforceable by an individual citizen, through the courts, rather than by vin-
dication through the political process. Id. at 267 (Rosenn, J., concurring). The Court's recog-
nition of the need to find an available plaintiff to enforce first amendment rights is re-
flected, Judge Rosenn argued, in the Court's liberalization of the standing rules applied in
overbreadth challenges under the free speech clause. Id. (Rosenn, J., concurring) (citing
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)). The concurrence declared that since al-
leged establishment clause violations "may not have an individual impact sufficient to con-
fer standing in the traditional sense," Americans United should be granted citizen standing
as the best available plaintiff to vindicate injury to its establishment clause interest of sepa-
ration of church and state. 619 F.2d at 267-68 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
Judge Weis, in a dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority's assertion that the
Flast Court was limited by the plaintiffs' pleadings to a finding only of taxpayer standing,
observing that the Flast plaintiffs also alleged in their brief "'injury to the right to live
under a government which separates itself strictly from the church.'" Id. at 270 (Weis, J.,
dissenting). The dissent insisted that the Valley Forge plaintiffs failed to allege any direct
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reversed the Third Circuit decision and held that Americans
United did not have standing, either as federal taxpayers or as citi-
zens, to challenge the Secretary's conveyance.21
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,22 examined the
constitutional aspects of the standing doctrine as developed in the
Court's recent opinions and declared that article III requires, at a
minimum, that a litigant show personal injury resulting from the
defendant's actions in order to invoke federal judicial power. 3 In
addition to the constitutional requirements of standing, the major-
ity observed, there exist the Court's self-imposed prudential con-
siderations, which form a secondary barrier for a federal plaintiff
to overcome.2" Turning to the principal case, the majority first ad-
dressed the plaintiffs' assertion of taxpayer standing and found
that the two-part "nexus" test for sufficient personal stake, as
enunciated by the Court in Flast v. Cohen, was not satisfied.26
injury caused by the property transfer, or any direct benefit to them if the conveyance were
voided or the property returned to the government. Id. at 270 (Weis, J., dissenting). Their
complaint thus was only a "generalized grievance," insufficient to confer standing. Id. at
270-71 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis maintained that the establishment clause does not
create a right enforceable by all citizens and that only plaintiffs alleging particularized in-
juries flowing from establishment clause violations will be granted standing. Id. at 271
(Weis, J., dissenting).
21 454 U.S. at 490.
" Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor joined in Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion. Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall and Blackmun
joined, dissented. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion.
23 454 U.S. at 472.
24 Id. at 474; see supra notes 2-3. The Court mentioned as a prudential limitation the
rule that a plaintiff must not assert jus tertii-the legal rights or interests of absent third
parties. 454 U.S. at 474-75; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Additionally, the
Court categorized the "zone of interests" test as a nonconstitutional standing requirement.
454 U.S. at 475. This test states that the plaintiff's alleged injury must be to an interest
"arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or consti-
tutional guarantee in question." Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1969); see infra note 48.
25 392 U.S. 83 (1968); see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
26 454 U.S. at 478-80. The oft-quoted, operative language in Flast that constitutes its
"double-nexus" test states: "First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between [his
taxpayer] status and the type of legislative enactment attacked.... Secondly, the taxpayer
must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional
infringement alleged." 392 U.S. at 102. The Valley Forge Court supported its finding that
the plaintiffs failed to show a connection between their taxpayer status and the precise na-
ture of the alleged infringement by surveying the line of cases denying taxpayer standing.
454 U.S. at 476-82. First, the Court noted that in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), a taxpayer, raising a due process challenge to federal funding to the states for im-
provement of maternal and infant health care, was denied standing because the alleged in-
jury was too "remote, fluctuating, and uncertain." 454 U.S. at 477; see 262 U.S. at 487.
1983]
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The Flast plaintiffs, Justice Rehnquist observed, were granted tax-
payer standing first, because they challenged an exercise of con-
gressional power under the taxing and spending clause and second,
because they alleged that such action violated the establishment
clause, a specific limitation on the taxing and spending power.2 7
The Court reasoned that Americans United failed the first prong
of this test because their challenge was not to an act of Congress,
but rather to a property transfer by the Department of HEW,
which was an executive branch action.2 Even more fundamentally,
the majority asserted, the conveyance under the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act constituted action taken pursuant
to the property clause, rather than an exercise of power granted by
the taxing and spending provision.29
As to the concept of citizen standing, the Court rejected the
Third Circuit's reasoning that the establishment clause creates in
each citizen a personal constitutional right, sufficient to confer
standing, to a government that does not establish religion.30 The
majority contended that the plaintiffs failed to identify any per-
sonal injury suffered as a consequence of the allegedly unconstitu-
tional property transfer other than an abstract, psychological one
insufficient to confer standing.31 Finally, Justice Rehnquist de-
Similarly, Justice Rehnquist observed that taxpayer standing was denied in a suit challeng-
ing, on establishment clause grounds, classroom bible reading in a state public school. 454
U.S. at 477-78; see Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1952). The Valley
Forge Court also pointed to the denial of taxpayer standing in United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974) and Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974), cases in which the challenges were not based upon the taxing and spending clause,
but, respectively, upon the accounts and incompatibility clauses of article I of the Constitu-
tion. 454 U.S. at 481; see 418 U.S. at 175, 228.
27 454 U.S. at 762; see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03, 105-06 (1968).
2 454 U.S. at 762 & n.15; see supra note 11.
2 454 U.S. at 762 & n.16.
20 Id. at 483. The Court determined that the instant case was indistinguishable from
Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217, and Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175, cases in which the plaintiffs
were found to have complained of only a generalized grievance, articulable by all citizens,
that the government had failed to observe constitutional provisions. 454 U.S. at 483. Such
injury, the Court noted, is insufficient to confer article III standing. Id. The majority also
rejected the notion that citizen standing should be granted in Valley Forge because the
establishment clause is a more "fundamental" limitation on governmental conduct than the
provisions involved in Schlesinger and Richardson. Id. at 484.
21 454 U.S. at 485-86. The plaintiff group's firm commitment to the principle of separa-
tion of church and state would, the Court recognized, cause its members to feel "the psycho-
logical consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one dis-
agrees." Id. at 485. Such "injury," however, falls short of the quantum required to confer
standing, which is "not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of
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clared that establishment clause claims demand no preferential
treatment, and supply no exceptions to standing burdens, because
there is "no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of con-
stitutional values."32
Justice Brennan, in a vigorous dissent, contended that, before
applying a standing test, the Court is constrained to determine
whether there exists a constitutional or statutory definition of in-
jury which creates a cause of action for redress of that injury.33
Justice Brennan viewed the establishment clause as embodying
one such definition of injury in its prohibition against the use of
tax funds to support religion.34 This prohibition, the dissent em-
phasized, is a clearly recognized constitutional limitation on Con-
gress' taxing and spending power, with the taxpayer as its intended
beneficiary.3 5 Thus, the dissent reasoned, the Valley Forge plain-
tiffs did have standing since they suffered precisely the type of in-
jury comprehended by the establishment clause, and because "the
federal taxpayer is a singularly 'proper and appropriate party to
invoke a federal court's jurisdiction' to challenge a federal bestowal
of largesse" as a violation of that clause.3"
Having argued, based on his interpretation of Flast, that the
Valley Forge plaintiffs should be granted taxpayer standing, Jus-
tice Brennan rejected the distinctions the majority drew between
the instant case and Flast37 First, the legislative-executive dichot-
omy is invalid, the dissent asserted, because although the first
amendment restricts legislative authority, executive branch offi-
cials are invariably the actors who carry out the legislative
his advocacy." Id. at 486.
32 Id. at 484.
13 Id. at 493 & n.5. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see infra note 65 and accompanying text.
" Id. at 500-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan quoted the Court's language
regarding the meaning of the establishment clause restriction on the power to tax: "'No tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt, to teach or practice
religion.'" Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 16 (1947)).
35 464 U.S. at 504. (Brennan, J., dissenting). An understanding of the taxpayer as the
intended beneficiary of the establishment clause, the dissent claimed, is what led the Flast
Court to its finding of a "constitutional imperative of taxpayer standing" in certain estab-
lishment clause cases. Id. at 507 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968)).
17 454 U.S. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also took issue with the
majority's narrow construction of the plaintiffs' pleadings as challenging not the Act itself,
but an executive branch action pursuarit to the Act. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at
479 n.15.
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scheme.3 8 Second, the dissent considered unavailing the majority's
distinction of Valley Forge as involving an exercise of property
clause authority rather than spending clause authority.39 Justice
Brennan maintained that the relationship of a taxpayer to a
breach of the establishment clause is the same whether the breach
is "in the form of a cash grant to build a facility, or in the nature
of a gift of property, including a facility already built. '40
It is suggested that the restrictive view of standing require-
ments demonstrated by the majority in Valley Forge will have a
negative impact upon the likelihood of standing being granted to
remaining classes of potential plaintiffs who challenge property
transfers on establishment clause grounds.41 While the Valley
Forge majority mentioned the lack of geographic proximity be-
tween the individual plaintiffs and the site of the transferred prop-
erty as a factor in support of its denial of standing,42 it is far from
certain that local residents whose land abuts the surplus property
would fare any better in gaining access to the federal courts to
" Id. at 510-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In rejecting the majority's distinction between
legislative and executive branch action, the dissent stated that "[t]he First Amendment
binds the Government as a whole, regardless of which branch is at work in a particular
instance." Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Confronting the majority's reliance upon Schlesinger
and Richardson, see supra note 26, the dissent maintained that standing was denied in
those cases not because the plaintiffs did not allege a violation of the spending clause, but
because the complaints did not even involve an appropriation or "distribution of govern-
ment largesse," 454 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Schlesinger plaintiffs con-
tested the constitutionality of permitting members of Congress to hold commissions in the
Armed Forces Reserve. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 210-11. The Richardson complaint centered
not upon the purpose of the CIA expenditure of funds but rather upon the plaintiffs' claim
that they should know how the agency spends public money. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175.
Similarly, the dissent distinguished Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952), relied
upon in part by the majority, see supra note 26, from the instant case, noting that the
Doremus taxpayers were denied standing because they were not complaining about the use
of their tax dollars. 454 U.S. at 507 & 505 n.16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40 454 U.S. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Stevens filed a
separate dissenting opinion, agreeing that the distinctions made by the majority were of no
jurisprudential significance. Id. at 513-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
"For the Court to hold that plaintiffs' standing depends on whether the Government's
transfer was an exercise of its power to spend money, on the one hand, or its power to
dispose of tangible property, on the other, is to trivialize the standing doctrine." Id. at 513-
14. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"' See Note, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. v. HEW:
Standing to Sue Under the Establishment Clause, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 975, 1007-08 (1981);
Comment, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc.: Citizen and Taxpayer Standing Under the Establishment Clause Revis-
ited, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 253, 269 (1982).
11 454 U.S. at 487 & n.23.
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challenge a particular transaction." It appears that the only poten-
tially successful means of attaining standing for such plaintiffs is
that of the "beneficial interest" theory. According to this theory,
plaintiffs who live on property contiguous to public land are
deemed to have an interest in the continued public use of the land
strong enough to accord them standing to challenge alleged reli-
gious use of the property.44 The "beneficial interest" theory, how-
ever, although espoused by some of the lower federal courts, has
never been adopted by the Supreme Court.48
The disappointed nonsectarian bidder for the surplus property
is another potential plaintiff who may be foreclosed from challeng-
ing a Valley Forge-type of property transfer.4 Since this plaintiff
4- Cf. Rhode Island Comm. on Energy v. General Servs. Admin., 561 F.2d 397, 401 (1st
Cir. 1977) (local residents of area surrounding surplus property, asserting standing based on
statutory noncompliance rather than on constitutional violation, denied standing). In Rhode
Island Comm. on Energy v. General Servs. Admin., the Rhode Island Committee on Energy
and individuals residing near a surplus Navy site, claiming threatened environmental injury,
were denied standing to challenge an impending sale of the property by the General Ser-
vices Administrator to an electric utility company that planned to build a nuclear power
plant on the site. Id. at 401-02. The plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, statutory noncompliance
with the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA), 40 U.S.C. §§ 471 et
seq. (1976), insofar as the Administrator ignored a Department of the Interior request that
it be granted the property and be permitted to use it as a wildlife refuge. 561 F.2d at 400.
Hence, a determination by the Administrator that the Navy site was "surplus property"
(transferrable to private or public entities) and not "excess property" (transferred to other
needful federal agencies), see supra note 11, was unauthorized so long as there existed a
requesting federal agency, 561 F.2d at 401. Although the court conceded that the plaintiffs
showed sufficient article I injury in fact through environmental harm, it nonetheless de-
nied the plaintiffs standing because it determined that, since nearby residents of surplus
federal property were not intended by Congress to be beneficiaries of the statute, they are
not within the "zone of interests" arguably protected by the Act. Id. at 401-02.
41 See Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 31 (10th Cir.) (county residents
allowed standing to challenge maintenance of religious monument on courthouse grounds as
violative of establishment clause), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); Allen v. Hickel, 424
F.2d 944, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (local residents granted standing to object to use of a
creche in Christmas pageant in nearby federal parkland), on remand 333 F. Supp. 1088
(D.D.C. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Baird v. White, 476 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D. Mass. 1979) (city resident had standing to
contest use of restricted area of Boston Common for papal mass); see also ACLU v. Rabun
County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886, 890 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (observers of
lighted Latin cross on state recreational property had standing to seek its removal).
'5 See Note, supra note 41, at 988, 1008.
46 See Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. United States Dep't
of HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 264 n.72 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Valley Forge Christian Col-
lege v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Judge
Rosenn asserted that in the factual context of Valley Forge, the existence of a plaintiff
possessed of economic interests that meet traditional standing requirements would be "rela-
tively rare." 619 F.2d at 268 (Rosenn, J., concurring). He further observed that there cer-
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essentially would be complaining of a loss of benefit, and not about
any form of coerced religious support or participation-the injury
recognized in most establishment clause cases47 -the "personal in-
terest" at stake might be deemed outside the "zone of interests"
protected by the establishment clause.4 8 Further, since the appli-
cant's main concern would be that it, rather than the religious or-
ganization, should have received the property, the Court might
deny standing on the ground that the claimed injury is not likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision. Redress of the claimed in-
jury would be too speculative in that the Court would have to as-
sume the unsuccessful bidder would benefit in a tangible fashion if
the government conveyance were declared void.4
tainly was no such plaintiff in the instant case since the record did not indicate any other
applicant competing for the transferred property. Id. at 268 n.2 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
While a local resident asserting statutory noncompliance with the FPASA would not
have standing to challenge a property transfer under the Act, see supra note 43, a disap-
pointed bidder for the government property might be deemed to have standing to challenge
such a transfer on grounds of statutory noncompliance. See Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d
1233, 1240-43 (3d Cir.) (unsuccessful bidder to furnish leasehold office space to General Ser-
vices Administration, which solicited bids pursuant to FPASA, granted standing to chal-
lenge alleged unlawful award to another), cert. denied, Gateway Center Corp. v. Merriam,
414 U.S. 911 (1973). In Public Citizen v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 565 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir.
1977), however, standing was denied to potential purchasers of surplus government indus-
trial machinery who sought to invalidate a negotiated sale by the General Services Adminis-
tration to Lockheed on the ground that it violated the FPASA because, inter alia, the GSA
failed to advertise publicly for competitive bids. Id. at 720.
47 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 224 & n.9 (1963); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947).
48 The "zone of interests" test is the second part of a two-part standing analysis for
challenges to federal governmental action announced by the Court in Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). This formulation requires a plaintiff to
allege (1) that due to the challenged action he incurred an article III "injury in fact, eco-
nomic or otherwise," and (2) that the injured interest is "arguably within the zone of inter-
ests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id.
at 152-53. This "zone of interests" test is a prudential rather than constitutional limitation.
See supra note 24. Thus, whereas the unsuccessful nonsectarian bidder who lost out to the
Valley Forge Christian College may meet the injury-in-fact test by alleging loss of economic
benefits, this injured interest may not be deemed within the zone of interests intended to be
protected by the establishment clause. The bidder, it is submitted, would thus fail the sec-
ond part of the Data Processing test.
49 An unsuccessful bidder would not be likely to receive the surplus property even if the
government's transfer of the property to a sectarian institution were voided as violative of
the establishment clause. Accordingly, the bidder would not be able to rely on "the remote
possibility, unsubstantiated by allegations of fact, that [its] situation might have been better
had respondents acted otherwise, and might improve were the court to afford relief." Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 507 (1975). Thus, the bidder's injury would be incapable of direct
redress by the court through the requested remedy. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-46 (1976); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-19 (1973);
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The dearth of available plaintiffs who might successfully pur-
sue an establishment clause challenge to a governmental land grant
is a potential consequence of the decision, and not a fundamental
flaw in the opinion's rationale, since "[t]he assumption that if re-
spondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is
not a reason to find standing. '50 Nevertheless, the scarcity of
plaintiffs who may sue in a factual context similar to Valley Forge
may be criticized,5' for such a result stands in marked contrast to
the general relaxation of federal standing requirements in
nontaxpayer suits, 52 and it represents a retreat from Flast and a
cf. Public Citizen v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 565 F.2d 708, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (potential
purchasers of surplus federal property denied standing to invalidate sale to Lockheed be-
cause alleged economic harm would not be remedied by rescission).
11 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (citation
omitted). But see United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) ("standing is not to be
denied simply because many people suffer the same injury").
"I The Court's holding in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975), that none of the
variously situated plaintiffs had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a zoning ordi-
nance, prompted Justice Brennan's criticism that the Court "tosses out of court almost
every conceivable kind of plaintiff who could be injured by the activity claimed to be uncon-
stitutional . . . ." Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan claimed that the
majority's result "can be explained only by an indefensible hostility to the claim on the
merits." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Perhaps the Valley Forge decision can similarly be
attributed to the majority's unwillingness to reach the merits, clothed in the rubric of stand-
ing. See Comment, supra note 41, at 266.
2 Recent Supreme Court decisions have predicated standing not only on tangible eco-
nomic injuries, but also on such abstract injuries as those to one's interest in the environ-
ment or social surroundings. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 154 (1970); L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-19, at 82-85. For example, users of parks in
the District of Columbia were held to have alleged sufficient harm by complaining that a
railroad rate increase permitted by a government agency would discourage recycling of
goods, thereby encouraging the manufacture of more goods, and ultimately cause more litter
everywhere, including District of Columbia parks. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,
688 (1973). The SCRAP Court granted plaintiffs standing while recognizing the "attenuated
line of causation to the eventual injury of which they complained." Id.; see Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972) (alleged harm to environmental interests sufficient in-
jury in fact, but standing denied due to plaintiffs' failure to use area in question). In the
context of social surroundings, the Court found that tenants who alleged "loss of important
benefits from interracial associations" had standing to bring a fair housing complaint
against the landlord's discriminatory practices. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972); see Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 112
(1979).
In addition to expansion of the type of injury sufficient for federal standing, the quan-
tum of injury a plaintiff must suffer in order to have a "personal stake" in the controversy
has often been trivial. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966)
(imposition of $1.50 poll tax); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206-07 (1962) (impairment of
even a fraction of one vote); see United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973);
Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601, 612-13, 629 (1968). Re-
cently, the Court granted standing to bring a fair housing complaint, based on loss of oppor-
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refortification of the bar on federal taxpayer suits."
It is submitted that the proper resolution of the standing di-
lemma in Valley Forge was to grant Americans United standing as
federal taxpayers to challenge the property grant. In denying tax-
payer standing, the majority insisted upon a literal application of
the first prong of the Flast test to the instant facts. Such an ap-
proach arguably engenders continued confusion as to the injury a
citizen-taxpayer must show in order to bring an establishment
clause challenge," since, as the four dissenting justices convinc-
ingly maintained, the differences the majority drew between Val-
ley Forge and Flast are more apparent than real.5 Specifically, the
denial of taxpayer standing in Valley Forge on the ground that the
property transfer was by an executive branch official is difficult to
reconcile with the grant of standing in Flast, which also involved a
challenge to actions taken by officials of the Department of HEW
pursuant to legislatively delegated authority.56 Similarly, the dis-
tunity to live in an integrated community, to a "tester" for a civil rights organization who
received false availability information from landlords. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 376 (1982). Cognizable personal injury is difficult to perceive in this case, since the
testor had no intention of actually buying or renting from the defendant. Id. at 373.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
, The two-part Flast test has been severely criticized for its restrictiveness and for the
incongruous results a strict adherence to that test creates. For example, Professor Davis
contends that "using courts to enforce constitutional and statutory limitations on the au-
thority of officers is as appropriate when the statute under which the officers act has been
enacted pursuant to the congressional power to tax and spend as it is when the statute has
been enacted pursuant to some other congressional power." Davis, supra note 52, at 636.
Professor Tribe maintains that it is not "realistic to assume that only spending programs as
such can consume significant tax funds" and that the Flast Court has "drawn a sharp if
artificial distinction between challenges to spending programs as such and challenges of any
other kind." L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-19, at 84 n.18. In one critic's view, implicit in a
ruling allowing taxpayers standing only to challenge appropriations under the taxing and
spending power "is the assumption that the character of the taxpayer's injury varies accord-
ing to the enumerated power which Congress happens to exercise in spending tax money,"
Comment, Standing to Contest Federal Appropriations, supra note 6, at 622, and "[s]uch a
distinction is indefensible," id. at 624.
11 See supra text accompanying notes 37-40. Justice Brennan, criticizing the distinc-
tions drawn by the Valley Forge majority, stated: "The tortuous distinctions thus produced
are specious, at best: at worst, they are pernicious to our constitutional heritage." 454 U.S.
at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18 See 454 U.S. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Secretary of HEW was sued in
Flast as the official authorized by Congress to administer the federal grants to religious
schools under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241(a),
821-827 (1976). 392 U.S. at 85.
The congressional-executive spending dichotomy derived from the first component of
the Flast nexus test was employed to deny standing to federal taxpayers in Swomley v.
Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981), in which plaintiffs challenged expenditures of fed-
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tinction between action taken pursuant to the spending power, and
that taken under the property clause, loses its significance in a
concrete factual setting. As the Court itself has previously indi-
cated,5 7 the impact on taxpayers is the same when land purchased
and facilities built with tax funds are deeded to a religious organi-
zation as when the government directly channels tax monies for
building facilities to a religious order.5 " Such superficial distinc-
eral tax funds by the Department of the Interior for the maintenance of a "Holy City"
replica on a federal game preserve. Id. at 1273-74; see Public Citizen, Inc. v. Simon, 539 F.2d
211, 216-18 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (executive spending is not "subject to taxpayer suit on a test
analogous to Flast').
57 In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), federal taxpayers were permitted to
make an establishment clause challenge to federal construction grants to church-related col-
leges pursuant to the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963. Id. at 676. The Court noted
that the Act provided for the government's retention of a 20-year interest in any facility
constructed with federal funds, and that if a recipient converted the facility to religious uses
during such Period, the government would recover its funds. Id. The Court struck down as
violative of the establishment clause that part of the Act which removed, after 20 years, the
restriction that the facility be used for secular purposes only. Id. at 683. In language that
bespeaks a recognition of the indistinction between a grant-in-aid and a grant of property,
vis-A-vis taxpayer injury, the Court stated:
It cannot be assumed that a substantial structure has no value after that period
and hence the unrestricted use of a valuable property is in effect a contribution of
some value to a religious body.... If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for
example, converted into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests,
the original federal grant will in part have the effect of advancing religion.
Id. Because in Valley Forge the government did not demand payment for the fair market
value of the property from the Valley Forge Christian College, it arguably acted to aid reli-
gion with federal taxpayers' dollars, albeit in an indirect form, by donating the proceeds
which otherwise would have been recovered by the Federal Treasury under the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act. See 40 U.S.C. § 485(a) (1976) (proceeds "from
any sale, lease, or other disposition of surplus property, shall be covered into the Treasury
as miscellaneous receipts"). Accordingly, it is suggested that, as in Tilton, federal taxpayer
standing should have been granted to Americans United to challenge the property transfer
as a compulsory taxpayer contribution to a religious body.
8 See 454 U.S. at 511-12 & 512-13 n.20 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Note, supra
note 41, at 992-93 ("the coerced financial support of religion ... is at least arguably present
in Americans United"). Criticizing the Flast test, Justice Harlan posited, "interest as tax-
payers arises, if at all, from the fact of an unlawful expenditure, and not as a consequence of
the expenditure's form." Flast, 392 U.S. at 123 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The lack of any
meaningful distinction between an appropriation of property and an appropriation of cash,
when constitutional rights are asserted, is further illustrated in cases involving abridgment
of a plaintiff's civil rights. E.g., McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 457-59, 462
(D.D.C. 1972). In McGlotten, a Black American was allowed standing to litigate the issue of
whether granting federal tax benefits to organizations which discriminated against the plain-
tiff on the basis of race is a form of federal financial assistance within the meaning of the
Civil Rights Act. 338 F. Supp. at 460-61. Answering in the affirmative, the court asserted
that "[d]istinctions as to the method of distribution of federal funds or their equivalent
seem beside the point." Id. at 461. Significantly, section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which protects citizens' fifth and fourteenth amendment equal protection rights, provides
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tions are the inevitable result of an approach which adheres
mechanically to the language of the Flast test without recognizing
the underlying first amendment guarantees that spawned the test.
Justice Brennan, on the other hand, employed a deeper level
analytical approach, beginning with an examination of historical
source materials that evidence the objectives of the Framers in
drafting the first amendment.8 9 Significantly, the Court has re-
that federal financial assistance shall not be denied to any person on the basis of race, color
or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). "Federal financial assistance" is only briefly
defined by the Act, see id. § 2000d-1, but the standard regulations issued pursuant to sec-
tion 2000d-1 by federal agencies congressionally authorized to extend such benefits state:
The term "Federal financial assistance" includes (1) grants and loans of Federal
funds, (2) the grant or donation of Federal property and interests in property,...
(4) the sale and lease of. . . Federal property or any interest in such property
without consideration or at a nominal consideration, or at a consideration which is
reduced for the purpose of assisting the recipient, or in recognition of the public
interest to be served by such sale or lease to the recipient.
45 C.F.R. § 80.13(f) (1981) (Dep't of Health and Human Services); see 7 C.F.R. § 15.2(g)
(1981) (Dep't of Agriculture); 28 C.F.R. § 42.102(c) (1981) (Dep't of Justice).
" In his dissent, Justice Brennan cited James Madison, recognized as "the leading ar-
chitect of the religion clauses of the first amendment," Flast, 392 U.S. at 103, specifically,
his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments and the Bill for Establish-
ing Religious Freedom authored by Thomas Jefferson and reintroduced by Madison, 7 years
after it originally was introduced. 454 U.S. at 502-04 & n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Madison's Remonstrance was his fervent response to a bill "Establishing a Provision for
Teachers of the Christian Religion," introduced in the Virginia State Assembly in 1785,
which provided for a tax levy to support teachers of the Christian religion. See id. at 502
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Flast, 392 U.S. at 104 n.24. In his Remonstrance, Madison argued
that it is an unalienable right of every man to exercise religion according to the dictates of
his own conviction and conscience. Madison further warned that "the same authority which
can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatso-
ever." 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 (Hunt ed. 1901), reprinted in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (supp. app.).
The Valley Forge dissent also quoted the operative language of the Virginia bill for
religious freedom: "That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious
worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opin-
ions or belief." 454 U.S. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 12 Henings Stat. 86
(1823)). When Madison became a member of the Constitutional Convention, and shortly
after the enactment of the Virginia bill in 1786, he proposed and secured the submission
and ratification of the first amendment at the first session of the First Congress. Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Thus, it has been gener-
ally recognized that Madison's views provide the necessary proof of the meaning of the first
amendment:
All the great instruments of the Virginia struggle for religious liberty thus
became warp and woof of our constitutional tradition, not simply by the course of
history, but by the common unifying force of Madison's life, thought and sponsor-
ship. He epitomized the whole of that tradition in the Amendment's compact, but
nonetheless comprehensive, phrasing.
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turned to these same materials in both Flast and pre-Flast cases
for guidance in elucidating the meaning of the establishment
clause.60 The most notable of the Court's resulting interpretations
is the sweeping statement that: "No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt, to teach or practice religion."61
It is submitted that, by focusing on the history and purpose of
the establishment clause, the dissenting justices correctly ap-
proached the issue of federal taxpayer standing when plaintiffs
raise a constitutional challenge to government bestowals of land
upon a religious institution. Such an approach comprehends both
the restrictions imposed upon government action by the establish-
ment clause and the taxpayer's relationship to those restrictions,
an understanding of which led the Flast Court to formulate its
double-nexus test.12 Indeed, Justice Brennan explained, the "two-
part Flast test did not supply the rationale for the Court's deci-
sion, but rather its exposition."6 3 Thus, by delving beyond the
words of the Flast test to the rights and protections afforded by
the establishment clause, which are the foundation of taxpayer
standing, the dissent found only profound similarities, rather than
Id. at 39 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Notwithstanding general recognition of the approach to the establishment clause recog-
nizing that taxpayers retain unique rights under that clause different from those afforded by
other constitutional provisions, it was expressly rejected by Justice Harlan. See Flast, 392
U.S. at 125-26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The flaw in such an approach, Justice Harlan main-
tained, is the obscurity and complexity of the historical purposes of the religious clauses of
the first amendment, rendering impossible any accurate interpretation of the Framers' in-
tentions. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). "[Gliven the ultimate obscurity of the Establishment
Clause's historical purposes, it is inappropriate for this Court to draw fundamental distinc-
tions among the several constitutional commands upon the supposed authority of isolated
dicta extracted from the clause's complex history." Id. at 126 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6o See Flast, 392 U.S. at 103-04 & 103 n.24; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-
16 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-64 (1878).
61 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), quoted in Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at
501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62 See 454 U.S. at 505-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-04.
Justice Brennan analyzed the Flast decision, granting standing to a federal taxpayer, as a
reconciling of the allowance of state and municipal taxpayer standing in federal court, see
supra note 6, with the Court's historical understanding that the establishment clause was
intended to prohibit the government from using tax funds for the advancement of religion,
454 U.S. at 507 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Flast double-nexus test, Justice Brennan
maintained, was intended to "set forth principles to guide future cases involving taxpayer
standing." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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fatal distinctions, between Valley Forge and Flast.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, however, accomplished
more than an insightful analysis of the rationale that led the Flast
Court to allow one establishment clause claim to pierce the barrier
against federal taxpayer suits. The dissent advocates what appears
to be a new theory of taxpayer standing, or at least expressly artic-
ulates for the first time what Justice Brennan found implicit in
Flast: a federal taxpayer is afforded by the establishment clause an
implied right of action to contest any governmental use of tax dol-
lars, either direct or indirect, that is alleged to support religion."
This conceptualization of taxpayer standing, it is submitted, pro-
vides a long-needed comprehensive synthesis of the historically
broad understanding of the establishment clause with the histori-
cally restrictive policy of channelling claims only through litigants
whose interests are legitimately at stake. Furthermore, there ap-
pears to be no logical deficiency in employing the implied right of
action theory in this context. Since the establishment clause pro-
hibits congressionally authorized use of tax funds for religious pur-
poses, and since the taxpayer is the direct and intended beneficiary
of that restriction, when a taxpayer points to use of tax dollars
that supports religion, he has automatically alleged sufficient arti-
cle III injury to be granted standing to press the establishment
" The concept of an implied right of taxpayers to contest governmental appropriations
of tax funds or their equivalent is discernible in Justice Brennan's observation that the
nature and source of the claim asserted is often decisive in finding cognizable article III
injury-
[T]he Constitution, and by legislation the Congress, may impart a new, and on
occasion unique, meaning to the terms "injury" and "causation" in particular stat-
utory or constitutional contexts. The Court makes a fundamental mistake when it
determines that a plaintiff has failed to satisfy the two-pronged "injury-in-fact"
test, or indeed any other test of "standing," without first determining whether the
Constitution or a statute defines injury, and creates a cause of action for redress
of that injury, in precisely the circumstances presented to the court.
454 U.S. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The implied right of action
theory of taxpayer standing was alluded to in the concurring opinions in Flast. Specifically,
Justice Douglas stated:
I would be as liberal in allowing taxpayers standing to object to [first amend-
ment violations] as I would in granting standing to people to complain of any
invasion of their rights under the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth or under
any other guarantee in the Constitution itself or in the Bill of Rights.
392 U.S. at 114 (Douglas, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Stewart asserted: "Because [the
establishment clause] plainly prohibits taxing and spending in aid of religion, every tax-
payer can claim a personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support of a religious
institution." Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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clause issue.65
The position advanced by the dissent in Valley Forge takes on
additional merit when contrasted with the Third Circuit's novel
theory of general citizen standing to pursue establishment clause
claims. 6 While the implied right of action theory is consistent with
traditional notions of injury and causation, a theory of standing
based upon a citizen's "shared individuated right" to constitu-
tional governance entirely dispenses with these essential standing
requirements, for a finding of injury under the establishment
clause in Valley Forge is seemingly unintelligible without reference
to the plaintiffs' taxpayer status. 7
" See 454 U.S. at 493 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The reasoning that leads to imply-
ing a right of taxpayer standing under the establishment clause when tax funds are used to
advance religion is analogous to the analysis employed by federal courts in implying causes
of action directly from the Constitution. See L. TmE, supra note 2, § 3-22, at 98 n.6. Both
analyses recognize that a plaintiff has been injured by some act of the defendant which
violates a constitutional duty owed directly to the plaintiff. For example, in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court noted
that the fourth amendment guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by federal authority. Id. at 392.
From this guarantee the Court inferred a cause of action for damages for a plaintiff's inju-
ries caused by an unreasonable search by federal officials in violation of the fourth amend-
ment. Id. at 396-98. See generally Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. Rav. 1109,
1146-55 (1969). Thus, when injury is alleged as a result of unconstitutional governmental
action, it should be deemed proper to determine the standing issue by ascertaining and
examining the interests intended to be protected by the constitutional provision allegedly
violated. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("standing may be based on an interest created by the Consti-
tution or a statute"); Note, Recent Standing Cases and a Possible Alternative Approach, 27
HAsTnNGs L.J. 213, 229-30 (1975) ("injury should be deemed sufficient for standing, even
though speculative or indirect or intangible, if the statute or constitutional provision in
question anticipates such an injury and seeks to protect against it"). See generally Bogen,
Standing Up for Flast: Taxpayer and Citizen Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, 67
Ky. L.J. 147, 162-71 (1978).
" See 619 F.2d at 262. The court of appeals, in recognizing the plaintiffs' claim to a
"personal constitutional right" flowing from the establishment clause, answered affirma-
tively the question left undecided in Justice Fortas' Flast concurrence, "whether 'the vital
interest of a citizen in the establishment issue, without reference to his taxpayer's status,
would be acceptable as a basis for [standing to bring] this [kind of] challenge.' "Id. (quoting
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 115-16 (Fortes, J., concurring)). Although the Third Circuit in-
sisted that its thesis of standing, based upon the establishment clause's creation in each
citizen of a "'personal constitutional right' to a government that does not establish reli-
gion," 619 F.2d at 265, is different from general citizen standing, id. at 262, this theory
nonetheless amounts to a "generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance"
too abstract to constitute injury in fact, Schiesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 217, 227 (1974); see Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 482-83.
'7 See 619 F.2d at 270 (Weis, J., dissenting); 454 U.S. at 485-86. Significantly, even the
concurring Third Circuit judge, arguing for liberalized standing under the first amendment,
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Finally, it is submitted that the implied right of action theory
will effect no undue increase in the number of plaintiffs suing in
federal court. Since a taxpayer still must complain of governmental
appropriation of tax dollars or their equivalent as allegedly viola-
tive of the establishment clause, the two-part standing test under
this formulation remains highly restrictive. 8 In contrast, the
"shared individuated right" theory of standing would effect a dra-
matic increase in litigation. It invites the result that any citizen
may be heard to raise any constitutional claim, not just an estab-
lishment clause claim, because all citizens are the "ultimate benefi-
ciaries" of a constitutionally run government. 9 The Third Circuit's
tacitly admitted that granting standing to Americans United under a "personal constitu-
tional right" theory is tantamount to abandonment of the traditional requirement of injury
in fact. 619 F.2d at 267-68 (Rosenn, J., concurring). Indeed, Judge Rosenn stated:
Unlike statutes allegedly violative of the Free Exercise and Free Speech
Clauses, statutes alleged to violate the Establishment Clause may not have an in-
dividual impact sufficient to confer standing in the traditional sense. Rather, such
statutes may have the more general effect or purpose of aiding religion. In such
circumstances, there is not an available class of likely plaintiffs whose conduct has
been or will be circumscribed by the existence of the offending statute and who
will thus have standing to seek judicial review.
Id. (Rosenn, J., concurring). The potential breadth of the "shared individual right" theory
has been criticized both for its acceptance of the separationists' interest in enforcement of
the establishment clause as concrete injury and for its augmentation of relief provided by
judicial review. See Note, supra note 41, at 1001.
" Davis, "Judicial Control of Administrative Action": A Review, 66 COLUM. L. Rv.
633, 665 (1966). The fear that federal courts would be inundated by countless suits if federal
taxpayer standing were allowed was anticipated and rebutted by Professor Davis before the
Court's Flast decision:
Arguments that the courts would be flooded with taxpayer suits if taxpayers
could challenge expenditures are based on a misunderstanding. The Court could,
and would in early cases, establish the constitutionality of basic spending pro-
grams, putting to rest through enunciation of principles more than nine-tenths of
potential problems. Then the judicial doors would be open for the special
problems, such as the validity of federal aid to parochial schools. The long-term
effect on the volume of litigation would be slight.
Id. The Flast Court itself recognized and rejected the "flood of litigation" argument, stating
that this fear "has been mitigated by the ready availability of the devices of class actions
and joinder under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted subsequent to the decision
in Frothingham." 392 U.S. at 94; see Comment, Standing to Contest Federal Appropria-
tions, supra note 6, at 625 ("[t]he excuse of crowded courtrooms is poor reason for denying
the vindication of constitutional rights"). Such comments, it is suggested, are equally appli-
cable to the more expansive, yet still bounded, theory of taxpayers' implied right under the
establishment clause to challenge governmental disbursements that support religion.
19 See 454 U.S. at 489-90 & n.26 (there is no principled basis for confining the "per-
sonal constitutional right" premise of standing to litigants relying on the establishment
clause); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) ("[tlhe
proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because
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theory thus runs directly counter to the Court's frequently articu-
lated refusal to hear "public interest" suits brought by citizens
seeking a ruling on the constitutionality of legislative or executive
branch action that had no concrete impact upon them. °
CONCLUSION
The Valley Forge Court was confronted with taxpayers raising
an establishment clause challenge to the government's bestowal of
land, purchased and improved with taxpayers' dollars, upon a reli-
gious institution, under a program that had already authorized
transfers to sectarian entities of surplus property valued at over
$25 million.71 Rather than permit Congress to be the first and last
judge of the constitutionality of such government action, the Court
should have granted standing to adjudicate the establishment of
religion issue to the most appropriate and most directly injured
party-the federal taxpayer. The grant of taxpayer standing in this
case could have been properly premised upon a broader reading of
the Flast double-nexus test. This would have involved a recogni-
tion that taxpayers qua taxpayers are as logically connected to gov-
ernmental allocation of tangible property pursuant to property
clause authority as they are to governmental appropriation of tax
funds pursuant to taxing and spending power. A second formula-
tion of taxpayer standing involves recognition of the taxpayer's im-
plied right under the establishment clause to attack governmental
allocation of its largesse. Although the former approach would
have been adequate to resolve the standing issue in Valley Forge,
its viability is limited to cases in which federal taxpayers attack
disbursement statutes that arise under either the taxing and
spending clause or the property clause. The second theory, how-
ever, provides the federal taxpayer with a right of action to chal-
citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries"). Justice
Harlan, dissenting in Flast, attacked the citizen "personal constitutional right" doctrine of
standing under the first amendment because it would "threaten the proper functioning both
of the federal courts and of the principle of separation of powers," and because it would
"very substantially increase the number of situations in which individual citizens could pre-
sent for adjudication 'generalized grievances about the conduct of government.'" Flast, 392
U.S. at 129-30 n.18 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
70 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-27 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634
(1937) (per curiam). See generally L. TRmE, supra note 2, § 3-20, at 89-92; Note, supra note
65, at 214-18.
7'1See supra note 15.
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lenge any use of his tax dollars to support religion, regardless of
the specific constitutional clause enabling that appropriation. It is
hoped that in future taxpayer suits brought under the establish-
ment clause, the Supreme Court will adopt the implied right of
action theory of standing. Such an adoption will make more mean-
ingful the taxpayer's establishment clause protections that are long
embedded in our constitutional heritage, and will avoid continued
confusion as to the nature of the injury a taxpayer must incur
before he is permitted to advance to the merits of his claim.
Christine F. Bianco
